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USE AND ABUSE OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL FRANKING PRIVILEGE'
In May of 1970 California Congressman George E. Brown, Jr., was
nearing the end of a hotly contested campaign for the Democratic Party's
nomination as its candidate for the United States Senate.2 To further
his candidacy Brown began mailing statewide 300,000 copies of a bro-
chure paid for by the Congressman and prepared by the public rela-
tions firm which directed his senatorial campaign. The brochures
were mailed under Brown's congressional franking privilege which ex-
empts members of Congress from the requirement of paying postage
for their correspondence conducted in the course of official business.4
Although the brochure purported to give the results of an earlier
franked environmental problems questionnaire, it portrayed six photo-
graphs of Brown in various speaking poses and presented the Con-
gressman's views on political topics unrelated to the subject of the ques-
tionnaire.5 Suit was brought to enjoin Brown from exercising his frank
on the grounds that the distribution constituted a dissemination of cam-
paign material and thus an abuse of the privilege.; A preliminary in-
junction was granted, the court asserting that this use of the franking
privilege by a member of Congress gave him a distinct and unfair advan-
tage over others not possessing the privilege, that such use caused irrep-
1. The word "frank" is derived from the latin francus which means "free." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 787 (4th ed. 1968). The franking privilege denotes the right of
a governmental official to send matter through the public mails free of postage.
Id. at 788; 39 U.S.C. § 3201(3)-(4) (1970). This Comment will only be concerned
with the franking privilege granted to United States Congressmen by 39 U.S.C.
§ 3210-13, 3215-16 and 3218 (1970). The "penalty mail" privileges granted to other
governmental officials are beyond the scope of this Comment. See 39 U.S.C. H8
3202-09 (1970).
2. Congressman Brown and Congressman John V. Tunney were both vying for
the Democratic nomination. The primary election was to be held June 2, 1970. Rising
v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824, 825 (C.D. Cal. 1970). For a detailed discussion of this
case see text accompanying notes 108-172 infra.
3. "It was agreed between the parties that 300,000 pieces of the questioned mailout
were printed." Id.
4. 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970) provides for congressional franked mailing of cor-
respondence on "official business" to any person. See text accompanying notes 45-63
infra.
5. Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824, 826 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
6. Id. at 825.
COMMENTS
arable harm to his opponents, and that the overriding public interest
required protection from the misuse of the frank.7  Although the mis-
application of the frank was restrained in this instance,8 the source of
the problem remains embedded in the federal law and provides a means
of campaign abuse.
Technological advances have favored the employment of the mass
media in political campaigns. 9 Nevertheless, direct mailing remains
an important and effective means of voter contact which can be utilized
to frame issues and to inform and persuade the electorate.'" It is there-
fore not surprising that the vast sums expended on campaigns and cam-
paign literature soar each year." In the context of rising campaign
costs and the persuasive value of direct mailings the potential abuse of
the franking privilege takes on significant proportions. An incumbent
national legislator who is allowed to use his privilege for direct mailings
of campaign literature to the prospective voting populace is given a
competitive advantage over the non-incumbent. Although this ad-
vantage is gained at the taxpayer's expense, 12 the legally permissible
limits of the privilege remain substantially undelineated and regulation
of the practice remains virtually ineffective. Congress has recently
reenacted the franking statutes in substantially the same form as had
previously existed.'" Congress has stated that the same groups that
enjoy the benefits of free mail will continue to enjoy these benefits
until changed by law.' 4 Thus the potential for abuse of these benefits
remains unchanged. The scope of this Comment will include the
historical development of the frank, the statutory defects inherent in
its definition, the permissible use of the privilege, present and proposed
7. Id. at 828.
8. Id.
9. In the last 40 years the use of radio and television facilities for "electronic cam-
paigning" has increased many fold. See generally Hearings on S. 2876 Before the
Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Ses ., 5 (1969).
10. See generally Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MUM. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1966) for a discussion concerning the necessity of contacting the electorate
while campaigning. The importance and effectiveness of direct mailing affects cam-
paigning on the state as well as the federal level. See L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, § 1,
at 2, cols. 5-6 (home ed.).
11. See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
12. See note 33 infra.
13. See note 42 infra.
14. HousE POST OFFICE AND CIvIL SERVICE COMMIrreE, POSTAL REORGANIZATION
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 91-1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
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regulatory supervision and proposed corrective measures which would
curtail its abuse.
Maintenance of postal facilities has historically remained a function
of the state.15 The British Post Office was established in the Ameri-
can colonies to deliver the mail as well as to raise revenues;' 6 the latter
purpose occasioned the embitterment of the colonists.' 7 During the
American Revolution, the establishment of postal service as a function
of the central government was one of the initial problems resolved by
the Continental Congress." Once the postal service was established, the
members of the Continental Congress were determined to secure all the
privileges enjoyed under the old legislative offices. Free mail privileges
were granted to soldiers in the Continental Army,'
9 various officials 20
and Congress itself.2'
Post-Colonial delegation of the postal power to the central govern-
ment eventually was embodied in the Constitution. 22  Thereafter frank-
1
15. Even the early Roman state had a postal system. A public postal service in
England was not established until the sixteenth century but private communications
had been carried by royal messengers for many years prior to this time. Official
letters on state matters constituted such a large portion of this correspondence that a
postal service supported directly by the state was the inevitable next step. L. ROGERS,
THE POSTAL POWER OF CoNGaRss 11 (1916) [hereinafter cited as ROGERS].
16. W. RICH, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE TO THE YEAR 1829, at
12-14 (1924) [hereinafter cited as RIcH]; C. KELLY, UNITED STATES POSTAL POLICY
1-6 (1931) [hereinafter cited as KELLY].
17. The Colonists were irritated by the Crown's manipulation of the post office to
raise revenues and they viewed this use as an onerous tax without representation.
They were further irritated by the Crown's use of the post office to maintain a sur-
veillance of colonial activity by examining the contents of letters. KELLY, supra
note 16, at 9-10; RICH, supra note 16, at 41-44.
18. Although at this time the Continental Congress did not legally possess sover-
eign powers, it was required to assume such powers by necessity. The Post Office was
created on July 26, 1775. II JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 208-09 (Lib.
Cong. ed. 1775) [hereinafter cited as JoURNAL.S); KELLY, supra note 16, at 157; RICH,
supra note 16, at 48; ROGERS, supra note 15, at 13-14.
19. M JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 342; IV JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 43.
20. M JOtURNALS, supra note 18, at 342. It is typical of the man that Benjamin
Franklin changed his frank with the coming of the new order from "Free, B. Franklin"
to "Be Free, Franklin." KELLY, supra note 16, at 24-25; RICH, supra note 16, at 50.
21. IM JOURNALS, supra note 18, at 267. The Articles of Confederation gave Con-
gress the limited power of establishing and regulating post offices "from one state to an-
other." IX JOmUALS, supra note 18, at 907. Even under this limited grant of power
Congress enacted a comprehensive ordinance in 1782 for the regulation of the post
office. 7 JOURNALS OF CoNGRss 383 (1800).
22. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 warrants Congress the power "[t]o establish post offices
and post roads." The Federalist Papers include only one reference to the postal
power:
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big legislation was promulgated to permit the transmission of congres-
sional correspondence and publications through the mails without pre-
payment of postage.23  The privilege, with but one exception,24 has
The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be a harmless power
and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public
conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States
can be deemed unworthy of the public care.
THE FEnDEAiusT No. 42, at 271 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). It is interesting
to note that James Madison also described the necessary and proper clause as "harm-
less." Id., No. 44, at 285-86. Apparently, the state conventions also lightly regarded
the postal power, for at the conventions there was a dearth of discussion concerning
its purpose or effect before ratification. RoGERs, supra note 15, at 25. However, this
constitutional authority is considered today to warrant Congress total control and regu-
lation over the entire postal system. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288
(1913); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904); In re Rapier, 143 U.S.
110 (1892); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. (6 Otto.) 727 (1878). The postal power is
now at least as plenary and encompassing as Congress' power over interstate commerce.
Crosby v. Weil, 382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943).
23. Act of September 22, 1789, ch. 16, § 1, 1 Stat. 70, Act of August 4, 1790,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 178, and Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 218 (these three
acts continued the ordinance enacted by the Continental Congress on October 18,
1782 which permitted free mail to and from members during sessions); Act of Feb-
ruary 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 19, 1 Stat. 237-38 (limited the congressional franking privi-
lege to packets of two ounces or less); Act of April 9, 1816, ch. 43, § 3, 3 Stat. 265-66
(extended the time during which congressmen enjoy the franking privilege to thirty
days before and after each session); Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 27, 4 Stat. 110
(extended the privilege to sixty days before and after each session); Act of March 3,
1845, ch. 43, §§ 1, 6-8, 5 Stat. 732-35 (repealed all former acts and tightened
up the regulations concerning who could use the frank, but congressmen retained the
privilege); Act of March 3, 1847, ch. 63, §§ 12-13, 9 Stat. 201-02 (provided that the
Treasury pay the Post Office Department $200,000 per year as reimbursement for
franked mailings and designated what was to be considered as a "public document");
Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 20, § 9, 9 Stat. 591 (raised the annual payment to
$500,000 per year, payable quarterly); Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 71, § 42, 12 Stat.
708-09 (enumerated who was allowed the privilege, including members of Congress, and
limited weight of franked packages to four ounces, except petitions to Congress and
seeds, roots, etc. Only congressmen were allowed to send and receive mail free, all
others were limited to sending only); Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 256, § 4, 17 Stat. 202
(repealed the provision of the Act of March 3, 1851 that provided for a specific ap-
propriation. The Post Office was directed to thereafter cover the cost of franked mail
from its yearly appropriation); Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 180-84, 17 Stat. 306
(again limited who could use the frank. Members of Congress retained the privilege);
Act of June 30, 1939, ch. 254, § 2, 53 Stat. 989 (clarified existing laws concerning the
franking privilege); Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 511, § 2, 67 Stat. 614 (provided that
the Post Office Department be paid by lump-sum appropriation for postage of franked
mail of the President, Vice-President and members and members-elect of Congress).
24. The privilege was abolished in full from 1873 to 1875. Act of January 31,
1873, ch. 82, 17 Stat. 421 (abolished the franking privilege altogether, including the
congressional privilege); Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 231, § 3, 17 Stat. 559 (repealed
all laws and parts of laws permitting any franked mail whatsoever). The congressional
franking privilege was reinstated by various acts between 1875 and 1895. Act of
1972]
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continually been in effect for nearly 200 years since its congressional
inception.
25
The reason underlying the franking policy is fundamentally sound.
Free transmission of letters on governmental business is directly con-
nected to the well-being of the people because of the nature of the
legislative function. There is no doubt but that in a democracy the
postal service must serve the constituent's need for enlightenment con-
cerning governmental activities. 26  The freedom of choice presented to
an electorate at the polls requires knowledge if that choice is to be
validly exercised. The franking privilege serves as an aid and auxiliary
in informing the populace since many members of Congress would be
unable to afford correspondence with their constituency in the absence
of the privilege. 2' The use of franked mail for official business also
provides an efficient means of posting since the Postal Service is not
required to stamp and cancel franked mail.28
However, the franking privilege can often be the subject of abuse
when those who are less than scrupulous attempt to subordinate its
intended purpose to their own ends. As early as the mid-nineteenth
century abuse of the privilege reached ludicrous proportions when a
senator solemnly declared his horse "a public document" and proceeded
to affix his frank to its bridle in order to transport it to his Philadelphia
residence free of charge.20 The substantial increase in the utilization
of the frank today provides even greater potential for its abuse.
Use of the franking privilege by members of Congress is extensive.
In 1959 the Postal Service carried 86,129,000 pieces of franked mail.80
March 3, 1875, ch. 128, § 5, 18 Stat. 343 (permitted congressmen to send speeches
and reports through the mails free); Act of December 15, 1877, ch. 3, 20 Stat. 10
(permitted all elected officials of the federal government to send or receive free public
documents printed by order of Congress); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 547, § 3, 26
Stat. 1081 (allowed members of Congress to send official mail under their frank to
any officer of the government); Act of January 12, 1895, ch. 23, §§ 65, 73, 28 Stat.
611, 617 (restored to congressmen the right to send franked letters to private persons
as well as to governmental officers).
25. See notes 21 and 23 supra.
26. KELLY, supra note 16, at 158.
27. Project, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 643, 658 & n.118 (1968).
28. A. SUMMERFIELD, U.S. MAL, THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERvlcE
58 (1960).
29. G. CULLiNAN, TiE POST OFsicn DBPA MENT 59 (1968).
30. U.S. Posr OFFICE DEP'T., 1968 Cosr ASCERTAINMENT REPORT 61. Franked
mail data is received from the Washington, D.C. Post Office, which accounts for
95% of the franked mail volume. A continuous daily record of this mail volume is
maintained at the Post Office. Id. at 60.
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In 1968 the total carried by the Service was 178,239,000 pieces."'
This represents more than a 100 percent increase in the volume of
franked mail in only ten years. In the same period of time the costs to
the Postal Service in handling franked mail have increased by more than
200 percent, from $3,009,000 in 195932 to $9,060,000 in 1968. 33
It is significant to note that until the 1956 election campaign costs of
presidential candidates ran about 19 to 20 cents per vote cast.34 But
in the twelve-year period from 1956 to 1968 costs increased by over 200
percent to a top value of 67 cents per vote cast for George Wallace.35
The total cost of all campaigns in 1968 was estimated at approximately
$300 million, an increase of 50 percent since 1964 and 100 percent
since 1956.36 The cost of congressional campaigns has been estimated
to run at least $100,000 for many House races37 and nearly $2,000,000
was spent on television campaigning during recent senatorial contests
in California and New York. 8 In this context, the likelihood that some
31. Id.
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 62. The Postal Service is reimbursed by Congress on a yearly basis for
the costs of handling franked mail. 39 U.S.C. § 3216(a) (1970) provides:
The postage on mail matter sent and received through the mails under the
franking privilege by. . . Members and Members-elect of Congress . . . including
registry fees if registration is required, and postage on correspondence sent by the
surviving spouse of a Member under section 3218 of this title, shall be paid by a
lump-sum appropriation to the legislative branch for the purpose, and then paid to
the Postal Service as postal revenue.
The official mail costs allocated for the 1970-71 fiscal year totaled $11,244,000.
1971 LEGISrATTvE APPROPRiTONS ACr, PuB. L. No. 91-382, 84 Stat. 807 (Aug. 18,
1970).
34. Hearings on S. 2876 Before the Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1969).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6;
AMOUNT SPENT ON LAST [19681 CAMPAIGN
[In percent]
$100,000 $100,001 to More than
Senate or less $200,000 $200,000
Democrats (16) 31.3 31.3 37.5
Republicans (7) 28.6 28.6 42.9
Senior' (12) 33.3 33.3 33.3
Junior (11) 27.3 27.3 45.5
State population over 5,000,000 (4) 25.0 75.0
Under 5,000,000 (19) 31.6 36.8 31.6
West (9) 33.3 22.2 44.4
Midwest (5) 40.0 60.0
South (6) 33.3 16.7 50.0
East (3) 66.7 33.3
Total (23) (30.4) (30.4) (39.1)
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congressmen will yield to temptation and use their franking privilege
in order to minimize exorbitant overall campaign costs appears great.
The major effect of money in a political campaign is to enable the
candidate to present his case to the electorate. Although the candi-
date with the greatest amount of campaign funds will not necessarily
win an election, the candidate without these funds will be less likely to
present his position to the populace.39 The advantage of having a
large source of funds on which to draw is that it enhances one's ability
to contact and persuade the populace. The franking privilege, when
directed toward this objective, eliminates the need for a substantial
portion of these funds and thus allows the incumbent candidate to sub-
1 Senators whose present service commenced prior to April 1957 are classified as
senior.
TABLE 4.2-AMOUNT SPENT ON LAST [1968] CAMPAIGN
[In percent]
$30,000 $30,001 to More than
House or less $60,000 $60,000
Democrats (50) 50.0 34.0 16.0
Republicans (41) 48.8 36.6 14.6
Senior1 (49) 69.4 22.4 8.2
Junior (42) 26.2 50.0 23.8
Urban (16) 50.0 25.0 25.0
Metropolitan (29) 44.8 41.4 13.8
Rural (46) 52.2 34.8 13.0
West (14) 35.7 42.9 21.4
Midwest (25) 64.0 32.0 4.0
South (24) 33.3 41.7 25.0
East (28) 57.1 28.6 14.3
Total (91) (49.4) (35.2) (15.4)
1 Representatives elected to 5 or more terms (including the 90th Cong.) are classified
as senior.
Id. at 57.
The recent Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (Feb. 7, 1972),
now limits campaign expenditures for use of the communications media by candidates
for a federal elective office to a sum no greater than either $50,000.00 or 10 cents
per capita of the voting age population of the particular geographical district. Id.
§ 104. This much needed reform will have its greatest effect over senatorial contests
in the large urban states such as New York and California. It is significant to note
that this new act limits the definition of "communications media" to broadcasting
stations, newspapers, magazines, outdoor advertising facilities and telephones (d. §
102), and omits any mention of direct mailing as a form of campaign communications.
Thus it appears that direct mailing under a congressional frank will remain a constant
source of campaign abuse and, in light of the new limitations on expenditures for
other campaign media, may, for the unscrupulous, become a major vehicle for cam-
paign communication.
39. Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. Rnv. 1, 3
(1966). See generally McKesson & Dickey, Financing of Political Compaigns: Abuses
and Suggested Controls, 34 S. CAL. L. Rv. 165 (1961).
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sidize his campaign by virtue of his office. The temptation for abuse
of the franking privilege, coupled with the ease with which it may be
misused, places the congressman who lacks sufficient campaign funds
in an uneasy position.
In 1970 Congress enacted the comprehensive Postal Reorganization
Act in an effort to improve and modernize the Postal Service.40 The
Post Office Department was converted into an independent establishment
under the Executive Branch.4' The statutes covering the franking privi-
lege were encompassed within the scope of the Act. However, reenact-
ment without reform was the result4 2 and the problems remain essentially
the same. The primary source of abuse is now embodied in Title 39
of the United States Code at sections 3210 and 3212. Section 3210
grants the franking privilege to members of Congress and permits the
dispatch of certain correspondence or other matter by mail free under
their frank to any person if it is being sent upon "official business. 43
40. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified in
scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
41. 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
42. Compare 39 U.S.C. § 4161-64, 4166-67 (1964) with 39 U.S.C. H9 3210-13,
3215-16 (1970). There are only minor changes in statutory language: The Clerk
and Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives are included as persons entitled
to use the franking privilege in H9 3210, 3211, and 3216(a); the surviving spouse of a
member of Congress is entitled to a limited use of the privilege in § 3218 (see note
64 infra); and the surviving spouse is recognized as a user of the privilege in § 3216
(a).
43. 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970) reads as follows:
The Vice President, Members, and Members-elect of Congress, Secretary of the
Senate, Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, Clerk of the House of Representatives,
and Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, until the thirtieth day of
June following the expiration of their respective terms of office, may send as
franked mail-
(1) matter, not exceeding 4 pounds in weight, upon official or departmental
business, to a Government official; and
(2) correspondence, not exceeding 4 ounces in weight, upon official business
to any person.
In the event of a vacancy in the office of the Secretary of the Senate, Sergeant
at Arms of the Senate, Clerk of the House of Representatives, or Sergeant at
Arms of the House of Representatives, any authorized person may exercise this
privilege in the officer's name during the period of the vacancy.
Members-elect of either house of Congress may exercise their franking privilege from
the commencement of their term, although no session has actually been called and they
have not been able to take the oath of office. 16 Op. Aar'Y GEN. 271 (1879); 5 Op.
Ar'Y GEN. 358 (1851). An unseated member thereafter loses the franking right.
19 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 592 (1890). The franking privilege exists only in favor of those
who are within the terms of the statutes. 11 Op. An-fy GEN. 35 (1864). The privi-
lege extends to those officials wherever they are located. 23 Op. Ar'Y GEN. 316
(1900). Under the earlier statutes the privilege was restricted to officials located at
the seat of government. 15 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 262 (1877).
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Material inserted in the Congressional Record may be directly mailed
under a congressional frank pursuant to section 3212."
I. SECTION 3210---"OFFCIAL BusiNEss"
The Postal Service, as the establishment responsible for the super-
vision of the use of free mailing for all governmental officials, has the
power to regulate the use of the congressional franking privilege as
authorized by section 3210. The Postmaster General, as the chief exec-
utive officer of the Postal Service,45 is required generally to superintend
the business of the Service and to execute all laws relative to that
agency. 4  To accomplish this task, Congress has delegated the Post-
al Service the power to promulgate rules and regulations which it deems
necessary to effectuate the objectives of the Act."
The Postal Service, however, has been lax in enacting and augmenting
any definitive set of regulations that will confine the use of the congres-
sional franking privilege within the letter and spirit of the statute.
While the Service has enacted a set of rules ostensibly to regulate the
use of the privilege," the rules have no prophylactic effect on the poten-
44. 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970) provides: "Members of Congress may send as franked
mail the Congressional Record, or any part thereof, or speeches or reports therein
contained." 44 U.S.C. § 907 (1970) provides in part:
The Public Printer may print and deliver, upon the order of a Member of
Congress and payment of the cost, extracts from the Congressional Record.
The Public Printer may furnish without cost to Members. . .envelopes, ready for
mailing the Congressional Record or any part of it, or speeches, or reports in
it. ..
45. 39 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
46. "mhe Postmaster General is the chief executive officer of the Postal Service
and ...is authorized to exercise the powers vested in the Postal Service. . . ." By-
laws of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service § 5.3, 36 Fed. Reg. 690
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Bylaws]. He is given wide discretion concerning the
management of the Postal Service. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 326, 330 (1920).
47. 39 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) reads in part as follows:
The Postal Service shall have the following general powers: ...(2) to adopt,
amend and repeal such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to accomplish
the objectives of this title.
"The exercise of the power of the Postal Service shall be directed by a Board of
Governors. .... " 39 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970). "[T]he Board may delegate the au-
thority vested in it to the Postmaster General ... ." Id. § 402. "Pursuant to 39
U.S.C. section 402, the Postmaster General is hereby delegated the authority to
exercise the powers of the Postal Service." Bylaws, supra note 46, § 3.9. Through
this delegation, the Postmaster General possesses the power to promulgate the rules
and regulations necessary to superintend the business of the Postal Service.
48. 39 C.F.R. § 137.1 (1971) reads as follows:
(a) Collection of postage. Postage on mail sent under the franking privilege
by the Vice President, Members and Members-elect of Congress, the Resident
Commissioner from Puerto Rico, the Secretary of the Senate, Sergeant at Arms
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tial for abuse. They fail to regulate where the need for regulation
exists. When the regulations are juxtaposed with their statutory coun-
of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives is paid annually by
a lump sum to the Post Office Department.
(b) Description. Official mail of Members of Congress is sent without pre-
payment of postage bearing written signature or a printed facsimile signature
instead of a postage stamp. Mail accepted under frank, and the officials au-
thorized to use franked mail, are shown in paragraph (c) of this section.
[Paragraph (c) provides a table which reads in part:]
Persons authorized to use Matter that may be franked
the frank
Vice President of the
United States, Mem-
bers of Congress, Res-
ident Commissioners,
Secretary of the Senate,
Sergeant at Arms of the
Senate, and Clerk of the
House.
Members of Congress
and Resident Com-
missioners.
Members of Congress
Vice President of the
United States, Mem-
bers and Members-
elect of Congress,
Resident Commis-
sioners, Secretary of the
Senate, and Sergeant
at Arms of the Senate.
Public documents printed
by order of Congress.
Congressional Record or
any part of it, or speeches
or reports contained in it.
Seeds and agricultural
reports from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
Official correspondence not
exceeding 4 ounces in
weight.
Official correspondence
when addressed to a Gov-
ernment official by title
may exceed 4 ounces in
weight, but must not
exceed 4 pounds.
(d) Restrictions. The following restrictions apply to franked mail:
(1) Official correspondence transmitted under frank of the Vice President,
Members and Members-elect of Congress, Secretary of the Senate, Sergeant at
Arms of the Senate, and Resident Commissioners must be on official or depart-
mental business.
(2) No franked mail will be admitted to the mail unless admissable as ordi-
nary mail.
(3) A person entitled to use franked mail may not loan his frank or permit
its use by any committee, organization, or association; or permit its use by any
person for the benefit or use of any committee, organization, or association.
This restriction does not apply to any committee composed of Members of Con-
gress.
(4) Franked mail is forwarded like any other mail, but when once delivered
to the addressee it may not be remailed. A package of franked pieces may be
sent by a person entitled to the franking privilege to one addressee, who, on re-
ceiving and opening the package, may on behalf of such person place addresses
on the franked articles and mail them.
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terparts, one fails to find any regulation at all 49 The only indication
of restriction upon the contents of franked correspondence is that "[o]ffi-
cial correspondence transmitted under frank of . . . Members . . . of
Congress . . . must be on official or departmental business. °50 The
rules do not attempt to indicate exactly what "official business" entails.
They merely recite the dictates of the statutes without providing a
sufficient aid in their interpretation. The lack of definition of "official
business" thus leaves the regulations as ambiguous as the statute. More-
over, with the exception of this brief set of rules, there have been no other
regulations promulgated by the Postal Service either as guides to inter-
pretation or as means of implementing the statutes.
A policy statement from an administrative agency, however, often
serves as an additional method of rulemaking. Opinions concerning
general governable principles often emanate from the delegated body.
5
The Postal Service has published such an opinion entitled "The Con-
gressional Franking Privilege."52  The statement, unfortunately, was
neither promulgated as a regulation of the Service nor published in the
(5) Franked mail is handled as ordinary mail. Fees for special services
must be paid at the time of the mailing.
(6) Franked mail must be addressed to the recipient by name, except as
provided in § 123.4(d) (2) [see note 88 infra].
(e) Weight and size limits-() Weight. Official correspondence is limited
to 4 ounces, except that when addressed to a Government official by title the limit
is 4 pounds ...
49. E.g., compare 39 U.S.C. § 3216(a) (1970):
The postage on mail matter sent and received through the mails under the
franking privilege by. . . Members. . . of Congress. . . shall be paid by a lump
sum appropriation to the legislative branch for the purpose, and then paid to the
Postal Service as postal revenue ...
with 39 C.F.R. § 137.1(a) (1971) which reads in part as follows: "Postage on mail
sent under the franking privilege by . . . Members . . . of Congress . . . is paid
annually by a lump sum to the Post Office Department . . . ;" compare 39 U.S.C.
§ 3210 (1970): ". . . Members . . . of Congress. . . may send as franked mail . . .
(1) matter. . . upon official business, to a Government official; and (2) correspond-
ence . . . upon official business to any person. . . ." with 39 C.F.R. § 137.1(d)(1)
(1971): "Official correspondence transmitted under the frank of . . . Members . . .
of Congress. . . must be on official or departmental business," and compare 39 U.S.C.
§ 3215 (1970):
A person entitled to use a frank may not lend it or permit its use by any com-
mittee, organization, or association, or permit its use by any person for the bene-
fit or use of any committee, organization or association. This section does not
apply to any committee composed of Members of Congress.
with 39 C.F.R. § 137.1(d)(3) (1971), supra note 47, which has substantially the
same language.
50. 39 C.F.R. § 137.1(d)(1) (1971).
51. Cf. Frozen Food v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
52. PosT OFFICE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION # 126 (April, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as PODP # 126].
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Federal Register. Its publication must therefore be considered as some-
thing less than a regulation and without the force and effect of law.
53
The opinion thus serves as an informal guideline void of the legal
potency embodied in a statute or regulation. The informal criteria
contained in this administrative opinion comprise the only substantial
attempt undertaken by the Postal Service to define what is "official
business" under section 3210. The opinion constitutes the sole de-
partmental attempt to place sensible limits upon the use of the franking
privilege. The publication reads in part:
Correspondence on "Official Business" is that in which the member
deals with the addressee as a citizen of the United States or constituent
as opposed to the relationship of personal friend, the relationship of
candidate or prospective candidate and voter or when the member
writes in the capacity of a member of a political party or faction.
54
This language specifically indicates that "official business" only en-
compasses correspondence directed to a constituent which neither con-
tains campaign material nor is otherwise related to partisan politics.
The opinion continues on to re-emphasize the concept that political
campaigning is not official business:
Appeals for political support, references to what a member expects
to do in the next Congress sent out before an election, discussion of a
prior campaign, discussion of a coming political campaign and refer-
ence to campaign opponents as such are all matters beyond the official
business concept.55
The publication further specifies that:
[Plictures which are of such size as to lead to the conclusion that their
purpose is to advertise the member rather than to illustrate the text are
not "official business." As an example, a picture of a member of Con-
gress either alone or with another individual would be presumed to be
for the purpose of personal advertising when it is larger than one-fourth
of the page on which it appears.56
Reference to forthcoming election and to the next Congress in letter
mailed before election are nonfrankable. .. .
53. See generally Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954), wherein a Depart-
ment of Justice Circular Letter, which was sent to all district attorneys but never
promulgated as a regulation of the department or published in the Federal Register, was
determined to be a mere housekeeping provision of the department and not entitled to
the effect of a regulation.
54. PODP # 126, supra note 52, at 1 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 6.
19721
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Reference to the past campaign is not frankable .... 68
The prominent label "Democrat" or "Republican" on member's pic-
ture is nonfrankable .... r9
Although the opinion only stands as a guideline, it is illustrative of the
administrative interpretation of "official business" as contained within
section 3210. There being no official interpretation contrary to the
one set forth above, the opinion could serve as a deterrent standard and
a partial clarification of the undefined concepts contained within sec-
tion 3210.60
Administrative and judicial application of these informal departmental
rules could aid in obviating the tremendous potential for abuse inherent
in the broad language contained within the statutory grant of the con-
gressional franking privilege. Unfortunately this cannot be the case.
The publication of these guidelines must have caused some complaint
by members of Congress. On December 26, 1968, only eight months
after publication of the guidelines, the General Counsel of the former
Post Office Department dispatched to every congressman an explanatory
letter regarding the nature of its prospective regulatory policy and the
force and effect of the opinion. The Postal Service stated that it
was not attempting to censor congressional mail"1 but that the
use of the franking privilege for correspondence on official business
is a matter strictly between the member of Congress and his con-
science. Under these circumstances we therefore feel that we can pro-
vide advisory guidelines to the officials possessing a franking privilege,
but that they themselves should have the responsibility for policing them-
selves. 6
2
As a federal district court in California later recognized, "it seems that
the Post Office Department has in no way withdrawn its earlier criteria
but has adopted an understandable 'hands off' policy rather than tangle
with possessors of the privilege." '6 The informal guidelines were there-
fore sapped of any regulatory strength and reduced to an impotent
statement merely intended to aid a congressman in dealing with his con-
science.
In summation, the meaning of "official business" in section 3210
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970).
61. Letter from Timothy J. May, General Counsel of the Post Office Department
to all members of Congress, December 26, 1968, noted in Rising v. Brown, 313 F.
Supp. 824, 827 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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remains in need of clarification. The Postal Service regulations fail to
aid in its interpretation. Further, the informal set of guidelines opined
by the Service clearly have no administrative value or deterrent effect.
In the absence of administrative action, the use of the congressional
franking privilege remains an unfettered and constant source of potential
abuse.
"['. SECTION 3212-FRANKING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
Misuse of the provisions of section 3210 is not the sole source of
franking abuse. The other franking statutes also offer great potential
for congressional misuse.64 The greatest potential for abuse is contained
within the broad language of section 3212. The section authorizes the
franked mailing of any part of the Congressional Record, including
reports or speeches.65 While the section appears innocuous on its face,
a careful analysis of its content reveals the statute's character to be so
expansive that it may easily be utilized as a means of accomplishing the
dissemination of campaign literature.
Since section 3212 allows any part of the Congressional Record to be
mailed without limitation or qualification, the possibility arises that
campaign material could be inserted into the Record for the sole
purpose of permitting a future mass mailing. The United States
district court in McGovern v. Martz6 recognized that, "[c]ongressmen
undoubtedly have a responsibility to inform their constituents, and . . .
circulation of the Congressional Record is a convenient method."
6 7
It is undeniably true that congressmen are vested with the representative
responsibility of informing their constituents. However, the extent of
that function is by no means qualified by the franking statute. The
statute fails to define the nature of material that may be inserted and
subsequently extracted from the Record for public dissemination at no
64. 39 U.S.C. § 3211 (1970) allows the franked mailing and receipt of all public
documents printed by order of Congress. The text of the section reads as follows:
The Vice President, Members of Congress, the Secretary of the Senate, the
Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and
the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, until the thirtieth day of
June following the expiration of their respective terms of office, may send and
receive as franked mail all public documents printed by order of Congress.
44 U.S.C. § 907 (1970) provides for reprint of public documents and reports at
cost on order of a Member of Congress. 39 U.S.C. § 3213 (1970) allows the
franked mailing of seeds and agricultural reports. 39 U.S.C. § 3218 (1970) permits
the spouse of a deceased Congressman to utilize franking privileges for 180 days after
his death if the correspondence relates to the death.
65. See note 44 supra for the text of this section.
66. 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960).
67. Id. at 348.
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cost to the Congressman. The unclear "official business" qualification
of section 3210 is omitted from section 3212, either by neglect or design.
Furthermore, section 3212 does not restrict the congressman to intra-
district circulation of franked matter. He is therefore allowed to dis-
tribute material embodied in the Record to any potential voter under
the pretext of fulfilling his congressional responsibility.
The administrative agency responsible for the execution of this stat-
ute, the Postal Service, has failed to enact a policy which would alleviate
the opportunity for glaring abuse offered by section 3212. The Service
has not promulgated any rules that would regulate the use of the stat-
ute. The only action undertaken by the Service has been a brief refer-
ence to the section in the informal guidelines 8 presented in the afore-
mentioned administrative opinion "The Congressional Franking Privi-
lege":
[Tihe Department has now concluded that pictures cannot be consid-
ered to be a part of the Record or of the speech or report in the Record,
and, therefore, may not be accepted under Section 4163.69
Although photographs must be excluded, any campaign statements or
reports may be included in the Record for the purpose of allowing their
later dissemination under the franking privilege.
The ease with which the section may be abused is matched only by the
potential for its misuse. There are no limitations upon who may be the
recipient of material franked under this statute. Senator Williams of
Delaware, cognizant of the problem, has seen fit to remark:
[Tlhere [is] nothing to prohibit a Congressional Member who [is]
running for the Presidency from using his franking privilege to circu-
late the entire United States with political propaganda and letting the
taxpayers pay the postage merely by putting his speeches in the Con-
gressional Record and having them reprinted.
70
Thus section 3212 which is unlimited and unrestricted, provides an even
greater potential for abuse than 3210. As is the case with section 3210,
the lack of administration regulations governing section 3212 is strik-
ing. 7
1
Within the series of franking statutes contained in Title 39 of the
United States Code there is only one effective prohibitory statute, sec-
tion 3215.72 This section forbids a congressman from lending or per-
68. See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
69. PODP # 126, supra note 52, at 9, discussing 39 U.S.C. § 4163 (1960), as
amended 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970).
70. 109 CONG. REc. 11711 (1963) (remarks of Senator Williams).
71. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
72. 39 U.S.C. § 3215 (1970) reads as follows:
COMMENTS
mitting the use of his frank by anyone unauthorized to use it.73 The
prohibition applies to any person, non-congressional committee,
organization or association. Under these terms, any type of political
campaign committee would be expressly prohibited from using the in-
cumbent's frank. But the prohibition would have no restricting effect
upon the free mailing of campaign literature when the material is mailed
personally by the incumbent. The fact that Congress enacted the stat-
ute indicates that the legislature was of the opinion that some measures
were required to terminate franking abuse. While the inhibitive effect
of the section's language may be relatively limited, the statute never-
theless serves as a valuable precedent for the future enactment of leg-
islation to restrict franking abuse.'
Congress has not specifically disallowed franked campaign mailings
in any of the above discussed statutes. However, if the franking privilege
is misused by a congressman for the mailing of political missives without
charge, the incumbent candidate is not only given a competitive advan-
tage during campaigning,75 but he is given this advantage at the tax-
payer's expense .7  Can this be what Congress intended? Senator Wil-
liams was of the opinion that "[i]t was not intended that the Congress
extend free junk-mailing privileges to political candidates who happen
to hold office in the Congress. ' 77 Regarding the taxpayer's burden, he
stated:
The taxpayers never were supposed to be shouldered with the responsi-
bility of financing the postal charges of political campaigns either in
congressional districts or in the senatorial races or for some Member of
Congress who might have the presidential "bug."78
The "official business" limitation in section 3210 arguably was de-
signed not only to prohibit franked correspondence of a non-official,
personal nature, but also to deny the use of the frank for campaign ma-
terial. Congress must have been aware of the myriad possibilities for
A person entitled to use a frank may not lend it or permit its use by any
committee, organization, or association, or permit its use by any person for the
benefit or use of any committee, organization, or association. This section does
not apply to any committee composed of Members of Congress.
73. Id.; 13 Op. ATr'y GEN. 157 (1869) and 11 Op. ATr'y GEN. 35 (1864) interpret
the franking privilege as a strictly personal privilege which cannot be delegated by one
enjoying it to any other person.
74. See text accompanying notes 182-184 infra for a discussion of the need for fur-
ther prohibitory language in the franking statutes.
75. Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
76. See 39 U.S.C. § 3216(a) (1970).
77. See 109 CONG. REc. 22888 (1963) (remarks of Senator Williams).
78. Id. at 22886.
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abuse. The prohibitory language of section 3215 apparently was en-
acted to prevent what would have been a common method of misuse
of the privilege, i.e., use by campaign committees. However, neither
Congress nor its delegated administrator, the Postal Service, has taken
further effective action. Administrative regulation under any of the
franking statutes has thus far been largely ineffectual. The Postal
Service guidelines contained in the administrative opinion previously
quoted 9 have little, if any, coercive effect or interpretative value.
As a practical matter, there are obvious political reasons underlying
franking abuse. Use of the privilege during political campaigning could
influence the outcome of an election. Misuse of the privilege during
electioneering allows the congressman to utilize direct mailing, an
effective campaign tool, without incurring its usual prohibitive cost.
When the privilege is abused in this manner, the incumbent candidate
is saving at least eight cents in first class postage per letter. The
average population of a congressional district in the 91st Congress
was reported at 410,000.0 Based on this statistic, an incumbent con-
gressman running for re-election in the House of Representatives could
achieve savings in postal charges in the sum of $32,800 per franked
mailing if the letter were sent to everyone residing in the district. In the
alternative, a California senatorial incumbent could conceivably -utilize
the franked campaign mailing to contact the 7,102,000 Californians
who voted in the 1968 senatorial election s ' at a savings of $568,160.
Although these figures may represent extreme instances of abuse, they
are nonetheless indicative of the magnitude of the problem. The sums
of money saved could then be channeled into other campaign areas.
Obviously, the incumbent would gain an unfair advantage over his non-
incumbent opponents.
[Ain incumbent in either the House or the Senate would have an un-
fair advantage over his opponent at home, because it would mean that
[the incumbent] could finance with free postage circulation of his politi-
cal material, whereas his opponent would have to raise the cash to pay
the postage. . . . It could run into a sizeable amount of money. 82
The entire cost of transporting the franked campaign literature would
be borne by the taxpayer since the carrying cost of franked mail
is appropriated yearly by the Congress from the treasury.8
79. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
80. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 STATISTcAL ABsTRcT oF THE UNMTED STATES 363.
81. Id. at 365.
82. 109 CONG. REc. 22886 (1963) (remarks of Senator Williams).
83. 39 U.S.C. § 3216(a) (1970). See note 33 supra for the text of this section.
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
In the entire history of congressional employment of the franking
privilege there have been only two instances in which an alleged misuse
of the privilege for campaign purposes has resulted in judicial scrutiny.84
Straus v. Gilbert5 and Rising v. Brown86 provide illustrative examples
of the problems herein recognized and the necessity for legislative re-
form and administrative regulation. The two cases arose within the last
four years; the courts, however, arrived at divergent results.
In Straus the defendant was the incumbent representative of the 22nd
Congressional District of New York, Jacob H. Gilbert.8 7 Congressman
Gilbert franked three sets of letters to every postal patron in his district,
principally for the purpose of campaigning in the 1968 Democratic Party
primary contest.8" Each of the three mailings contained a letter re-
84. Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Straus v. Gilbert, 293
F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The existence of only two reported cases liti-
gating issues of abuse of the franking privilege is not indicative of the fact that
there have been only two violations but is more likely attributable to the difficulty of
detecting violations.
85. 293 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
86. 313 F. Supp. 824 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
87. 293 F. Supp. at 215.
88. Id. Gilbert had franked all three of the mailouts without addressing them to
any specific addressee, but by listing the recipient as "Postal Patron-Local, 22nd
Congressional District, Bronx, New York." Id. This simplified form of addressing is
authorized pursuant to the "junk mail" privilege which is employed only by members
of the House of Representatives. The "junk mail" privilege was originally proposed in
the House as part of the 1961 Legislative Appropriations Act. See 106 CONG. REc.
3275 (1960) (remarks of Representative Conte); Id. at 3283-86. The House that
year included a provision for the franked distribution of unaddressed mail in the
cities similar to the franking distribution which had previously been practiced in rural
areas but which the Postal Service had theretofore declined to handle in urban areas.
Id. The Senate, due to the vigorous condemnation of this proposal by Senator Wil-
liams, eliminated the provision. Id. at 8617-19. The next year the House of Repre-
sentatives again included the provision and passed it on the very last day before
Congress adjourned, thus precluding the Senate from immediately disapproving the
House's action. 107 CONG. Rnc. 21528 (1961); see id. at A8300 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Ashbrook). Finally, in 1963, Senator Williams proposed an amendment
to the 1964 Legislative Appropriation Bill which would require the name of the
specific addressee on every piece of franked mail. 109 CONG. REc. 10763 (1963)
(remarks of Senator Williams). The House responded by claiming that the action
was a breach of comity between the two houses of Congress in that the Senate was
trying to dictate to the House on the lower body's "housekeeping functions." The
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Legislative Appropriations threatened to
retaliate by exposing alleged "call girls" on a certain senator's payroll. The upper
chamber was outraged by the Representative's threat and refused to accept the
Senate Committee's conference report that made the proposed restriction only applicable
to the Senate. Id. at 22885-91. Finally, the Senate acquiesced and accepted a House
compromise amendment which prevented "occupant" addressing by senators but per-
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printed from the Congressional Record in which the original Record
type had been reset to provide for greater textual legibility. 80  The first
mailing contained a cover letter in which the Congressman introduced
himself to the recipient and offered his assistance. 90 The additional
letters contained photographs of Representative Gilbert. 1
The plaintiff, a non-incumbent opponent of Gilbert in the primary
race, brought a motion before the district court for a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin the defendant from using his frank to send this
material.92  The allegations set forth were that Title 39 of the United
States Code at section 416393 required a reprint from the Congressional
Record to be an exact copy without any variation; that material inserted
into the Record primarily for campaign purposes could not be franked;
and that franked literature could only be sent to persons residing in the
22nd District as it existed at the time of the mailing.
94
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's contentions in a terse two-
page decision.9" In response to the plaintiffs proposition that the
mitted the same for representatives, limited to the representative's congressional dis-
trict. Id. at 25025-27.
The use of "junk mail" addressing by the House continues today notwithstand-
ing an attempt by Representative Ashbrook in 1966 to stop the practice. H.R.
REP. No. 11986, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Although there is no express statutory
authorization for simplified addressing, the Postal Service has acknowledged and im-
pliedly approved of the practice of members of the House by the promulgation of
certain regulations to control its use. 39 C.F.R. § 122.4(d)(2) (1971); cf. id. at
§ 122.4(d) (1) (1971), which requires specificity in addressing on the franked mailings
sent by a member of the Senate.
It is submitted that a reasonable explanation for the House of Representative's in-
sistence on retaining the use of "junk mail" addressing is that the representatives are
required to run for re-election every two years as compared to every six years for sena-
tors. The representatives are therefore under greater pressure to keep their names
in the minds of their constituents and accomplish this by regularly sending them "re-
ports" from Washington. These reports serve a dual purpose-enlightenment of the
constituency and political edification of the representative.
89. Straus v. Gilbert, 293 F. Supp. 214, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 39 U.S.C. § 4163 (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970).
94. 293 F. Supp. at 215.
95. The Honorable Constance Baker Motley, United States District Judge of the
Southern District of New York, asserted original jurisdiction over the controversy pur-
suant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to the postal service.
This statute grants original jurisdiction in the district courts over any civil suit
whose cause of action arises under an act of Congress relating to the postal service.
The Straus court noted that the franking privilege is governed in part by 39 U.S.C.
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franking statute required reprints to be exact reproductions, the court
stated:
This court does not read this statute as requiring exact duplication of
the Congressional Record without variance. Neither do we believe
that inserting a covering letter nor the addition of a picture removes the
reprint from the ambit of the statute. 90
The court therefore declined to interpret the statute in a restrictive sense
but held that some variations in the reprint from the text of the Con-
gressional Record are permissible.
The court then rejected the plaintiff's contention that the statute
did not allow the franking of the Record where the reprinted material
was placed in the daily journal for campaign purposes97 and brusquely
concluded that:
a) the statute has no such limitation; b) the letters here at issue do not
mention the campaign; and c) this court does not, and cannot, tell
Congress what it can print in its Journal.98
Finally, the plaintiff argued that the defendant improperly franked
the literature in question to persons not yet legally a part of the 22nd
Congressional District and should be restricted to the district as it ap-
peared before redistricting.99 The court once again held that section
4163100 had no such limitations. 1 ' The court continued: "Defendant
is properly addressing the letters to his constituents."10 2  The tribunal
recognized that the statute fails to place any constraints on the location
of an addressee of franked material,'0 3 and the court was not inclined
to impose any judicial restraints on the section in the absence of express
statutory language.
In the final analysis, the court reiterated that circulation of the Con-
gressional Record is a convenient method for a congressman to inform
his constituency 0 and remarked in closing that, in any event, it was not
§ 4161 et seq. (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3210 et seq. (1970). 293 F. Supp.
at 216.
96. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 215.
100. 39 U.S.C. § 4163 (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970).
101. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
102. Id.
103. But see note 88 supra discussing the voluntary constraints adopted by the
House of Representatives to limit the franking of "junk mail" by each representative
to his own district. The maiouts in this case were all of the "junk" variety. See
39 C.F.R. § 122.4(d)(2)(i) & (v) (1971).
104. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
1972]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
willing to intrude on a political dispute. 10 5 Therefore, the plaintiff's
request for a preliminary injunction was denied.' 06
Two years after the Straus decision the United States District Court
for the Central District of California was presented with issues similar
in nature to those cursorily dismissed in Straus.10 7  In Rising v. Brown'08
the court shared the Straus court's apprehension of judicial involvement
"in disputes of a purely political nature, t10 90 especially at election time,
but [recognized that] the public has an overriding interest in being pro-
tected against abuses of the franking privilege."'110
The principal parties in Rising v. Brown"' were two incumbent
congressmen from nearly adjoining California districts who were battling
for the Democratic Party nomination for United States Senator in the
June 2, 1970 primary election. 112  Other major candidates for senator
in this election included the incumbent, Senator George Murphy, and
at least two non-incumbents who did not possess the franking privilege."'
The defendant, George E. Brown, Jr., in January, 1970, mailed a
franked post card to persons residing throughout the State of Califor-
nia." 4 One side of the post card introduced the Congressman to the
recipient and invited the recipient to participate in a survey of voter at-
titudes concerning environmental problems for the Congressman's
House committee." 5 The reverse side of the post card contained nine
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The court in Straus decided the case solely on the basis of section 4163, as
amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970). Note that in Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824
(C.D. Cal. 1970) section 4161, as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970), was
brought into issue in addition to section 4163.
108. 313 F. Supp. 824 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
109. The issue at bar in this case, as in Straus, arises out of a political dispute,
but is not a "political qdlJstion." Federal courts will deny jurisdiction of a case
which involves a "political question" as being nonjusticiable even though such questions
could involve actual controversies. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
164-66 (1803). The rule is founded on the doctrine of separation of powers and
judicial self-restraint. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The issues in both
the Straus and Brown cases do not involve a potential conflict between two coordinate
branches of government and therefore do not constitute "political questions" in the
judicial sense of the words. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
110. Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
111. 313 F. Supp. 824 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
112. Id. at 825.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The message on one side of the post card read as follows:
Dear Concerned Citizen:
I am asking you, a resident of California to participate in this survey. As a
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questions with adjacent "Yes" and "No" boxes for the recipient to
check before returning the card to Congressman Brown.
1 16
Just two weeks prior to the June 2 primary, Brown began mailing
300,000 copies"' of a brochure to the persons who responded to the
questionnaire and to others who had not responded."18  The brochure
was entitled "Congressman George Brown-Report from Washington,
May, 1970.""' On the first panel of the brochure was printed the fol-
lowing message in George Brown's handwriting: "Thanks for answer-
ing my questionnaire-thought you would be interested in seeing this.
George Brown."' 20 The brochure, when unfolded, contained eight pan-
els, two of which were concerned with a discussion of the work of the
House Science and Astronautics Subcommittee investigating environ-
mental problems and the results of the January, 1970, voter survey.' 2 '
One panel listed environmental proposals introduced by the Congress-
man during the 91st Congress; another panel contained Brown's views
on the Southeast Asian conflict; and another listed the Congressman's
voting record in the House of Representatives on war-related issues.' 22
The remainder of the mailing contained ten photographs, six of which
were of Brown in various speaking poses.' 23 These brochures were not
printed at government expense but were prepared for the Congressman
by the public relations firm that was managing his campaign. They
were printed in Los Angeles and were stuffed into envelopes by volunteer
campaign workers in various campaign headquarters and in homes.' 24
The co-plaintiffs, Congressman John V. Tunney, 28 his campaign
member of the Science and Astronautics Committee of the United States Con-
gress, I am interested in your opinions of these questions. This spring, our
committee will be holding hearings in California on environmental pollution.
I would very much appreciate the opportunity to present your views to the com-
mittee. The data collected will be made available to all California congressmen,
other elected officials and the press.
Sincerely yours,
George Brown,
Member of Congress. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. id.
119. Rising v. Brown, Civil No. 70-1123-DWW (C.D. Cal., filed May 12, 1970),
Affidavit of Lee Jean Bell, Exhibit A attached thereto, filed May 26, 1970.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 313 F. Supp. at 826-27.
125. Mr. Tunney subsequently won the June 2, 1970 Democratic primary. L.A.
Times, June 3, 1970, at 1, col. 1 (home ed.). Tunney went on to defeat the incumbent
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manager Nelson C. Rising, and the campaign committee Friends of
John V. Tunney, South, Inc., made a motion before the Honorable Da-
vid W. Williams for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defend-
ant Brown and his campaign aides from using the defendant's franking
privilege to mail the brochure in question.'26 The Brown court was
presented with substantially similar issues brought before the Straus
court.127  However, in this instance a preliminary injunction issued from
the court.'
25
Prior to an adjudication of the case on the merits, the Brown court
was faced with the threshold question of standing. The defendants as-
serted that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue and that their interest
in postal revenues and the administration of postal laws was that of
members of the general public.'"2 The defendants relied on Frothing-
ham v. Mellon3 ° for the proposition that the interest of a taxpayer in
the monies of the treasury does not provide standing to sue for alleged
improper expenditures of public funds.' 31 Directing its attention to the
defendants contention, the Brown court stated that the holding in Froth-
ingham has slowly been eroded 32 in the nearly 50 years since the de-
cision was announced. The court proceeded to recognize Baker v.
Carrd3 3 as expositive of the proposition that a plaintiff has standing to
maintain an action if he alleges such a personal stake in the outcome as
to assure "concrete adverseness."' 34
Senator George Murphy in the November 1970 final election. L.A. Times, Nov. 3,
1970, at 1, col. 1 (home ed.).
126. 313 F. Supp. at 825.
127. Involved was an interpretation of 39 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4163 (1960), as amended,
39 U.S.C. §§ 3210, 3212 (1970). See note 107 supra.
128. 313 F. Supp. at 828.
129. Id. at 826.
130. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
131. Id. at 487:
[The interest of the taxpayer] in the monies of the treasury-partly realized from
taxation and partly from other sources-is shared with millions of others; is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of
any payment out of the funds so remote, fluctuating, and uncertain that no basis
is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
132. 313 F. Supp. at 826 n.1, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Smiley v.
Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
133. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134. 313 F. Supp. at 826, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) which
held:
[The plaintiff must allege] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions.
COMMENTS
The plaintiffs had stated in their reply memorandum in support of
the preliminary injunction that:
this particular misuse of tax funds involves the most visible phases of
the political process and some of the most sensitive questions of public
policy with respect to free communication between elected representa-
tives and voters .... 13r
Nevertheless the court found that:
the question plaintiffs present to this Court is whether Congressman
Brown shall be required to place a 6l stamp upon each envelope
containing [the literature in question]. . . . The issue is not specula-
tive; it presents a specific controversy; it involves the question whether
tax dollars shall be reimbursed to the post office by the Congress of the
United States for an illegal use of the franking privilege; and it raises
the disturbing possibility that the primary campaign of a major political
party is being influenced by misuse of public funds.13 6
On this basis the court ruled that the need for "concrete adverseness"
required by Baker v. Carr31 was satisfied by the great personal stake
plaintiff Tunney had in the imminent primary election and that Tunney
therefore had standing to maintain the suit against Congressman Brown.
38
However, the district court declined to pass on whether the co-plaintiffs
Rising or Friends had standing to sue.139
On the merits of the controversy, the defense asserted a two-
pronged argument: The mailed brochures satisfied the official busi-
ness requirement of the statute; and in the alternative, the brochures
were frankable as a part of the Congressional Record. 40  Employing a
process of statutory analysis, regulatory interpretation and factual ap-
plication, the court cogently rejected both of the defendant's conten-
tions. 41
The court's opinion was focused largely on whether the franked
brochures were of an "official business" nature. The defendant set forth
the argument that the pamphlets in issue represented the results of the
questionnaire survey initiated by the defendant and thus the mailing
was on official business and within the defendant's franking privi-
135. Rising v. Brown, Civil No. 71-1123-DWW (C.D. Cal., filed May 12, 1970),
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 8, filed May
26, 1970.
136. 313 F. Supp. at 826 (quoting plaintiff's brief).
137. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
138. 313 F. Supp. at 826.
139. See text following note 171 infra.
140. 313 F. Supp. at 826-27.
141. Id. at 826-28.
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lege. 142 Upon analysis and in recognition of the Postal Service guide-
lines, 143 the court noted that the brochure did indeed concern itself in
part with the work of the defendant's environmental subcommittee and
was directed to the results of the questionnaire,144 but that "at least 50
percent of it is devoted to other matters which strongly lends itself to the
suspicion that it is promotive of getting votes for the sender.' 14  The
fact the Congressman was an outspoken opponent of the Southeast
Asian war and the fact two entire panels of the brochure were devoted
to the Congressman's views and voting on this subject were further
noted by the court.14 6  Consequently, the "sudden departure in
[Brown's] brochure from the environmental interest of his subcommittee
to his views on the war [suggested] a dual purpose.' ' 47  In light of the
fact that the material was paid for by Brown, prepared by a public
relations firm, printed and stuffed in California, and most significantly,
mailed but two weeks before the primary election, 48 the court concluded
that "[t]hese facts support the claim that the material is not 'official
business' but is more closely related to campaign material."'149
Alternatively, the defendant asserted that the brochure was frankable
under section 4163150 since the entire text of the pamphlet had been
inserted into the Congressional Record. The defendants cited Straus
v. Gilbert"" for the holding that section 4163 does not prohibit a con-
gressman's use of the frank to mail reprints of the Congressional Record
even if mailed for campaign purposes.'8 2 The defendant Brown had
caused the brochure to be inserted into the Congressional Record on
May 21, 1970.'53
The court remarked that it was not bound by the Straus case 5 4 but
142. Id. at 826.
143. Id. at 827. The fact that the court included the Postal Service guidelines
in its opinion without expressing disapproval of their contents strongly implies the
court's agreement with the guideline provisions. See text accompanying notes 44-59
supra for the partial text of these guidelines.
144. 313 F. Supp. at 826.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 826-27.
149. Id. at 827.
150. 39 U.S.C. § 4163 (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970).
151. 293 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See text accompanying notes 86-105
supra.
152. 313 F. Supp. at 827.
153. 116 CONG. Rac. E4645-46 (daily ed. May 22, 1970).
154. Straus v. Gilbert, 293 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), is a trial level federal case
from another district and is therefore only persuasive authority.
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nevertheless distinguished the instant case from Straus:
Here, the defendant caused the pamphlet to become part of the Con-
gressional Record one day after this Court had granted a temporary re-
straining order and after many thousands of the brochure had already
been mailed with use of franking privilege.155
Brown had not inserted the material into the Record until nine days
after the case was filed. The court continued:
I do not believe that § 4163 can be interpreted as to eliminate all
protections against the abuse of the frank, else a congressman could cause
undisputed campaign material to be inserted into the Congressional
Record for the sole purpose of allowing him to disseminate it among
the people of his district or state by using the franking privilege. In
instances where persons possessing the franking privilege were running
for public office against persons not possessing the privilege, the former
would be given a distinct and unfair advantage.
156
In accordance, the court issued the preliminary injunction.
157
Although Brown and Straus are purportedly distinguishable, they are
nevertheless irreconcilable in their implications and approach. The two
cases provide demonstrable examples of the necessity of administrative
and legislative reform.
Straus declined to interpret the privilege in a restrictive manner.
While it is conceded that Straus addressed itself primarily to the de-
fendant's insertion of the material into the Congressional Record as a
permissible means of constituent communication,' 5 s the material dis-
seminated had been transformed from that appearing in the Record.'59
The defendant had given it a politically competitive gloss. 6 ' Never-
theless, the court found the statute not to require "exact duplication'' 
n
6
and declined to judicially impart any other limitations into the statute.
This accordingly broadened the already wide range of potential abuse
of the franking privilege.' 6 2 Recognizing the necessity of congressional
communication with the populace, 6 3 the court was heedless of the dual
purpose that the actual use of section 4163 is capable of in the absence
of regulation. Section 4163 allows both legitimate utilization for
155. 313 F. Supp. at 827.
156. 313 F. Supp. at 827-28.
157. Id. at 828.
158. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
159. Id. at 215.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 216.
162. See text accompanying notes 64-83 supra.
163. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
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constituent enlightenment and highly questionable misuse for campaign
purposes. Senator Lausche recognized this dual purpose when he
stated:
I understand the benefits which result from communication, but alto-
gether too frequently the franking privilege is used, not for the purpose
of informing and edifying the minds of the citizenry, but for the pur-
pose of edifying ourselves on the political level.
164
Apparently the Straus court did not wish to draw this distinction. The
court expressed reluctance at the prospect of inhibiting the activities of
a congressman and remarked in closing that it would not intrude on a
political dispute." 5
The Brown court approached the issues with a definite awareness
of the potential abuse of the franking privilege. Mindful of the am-
biguity inherent in the phrase "official business," the court applied the
administrative guidelines in an ad hoe manner. Although the court
avoided a direct confrontation with the Straus opinion, its dicta indicate
that it assumed a dissimilar view concerning the scope of section 4163:
"[This section cannot] be interpreted as to eliminate all protections
against the abuse of the frank . . ... "I This dicta would seem to
indicate that the fact of Brown's tardiness in causing the pamphlet to be
printed in the Congressional Record'67 was not the determinative factor
in the court's decision. Rather, this court apparently would disallow any
reliance upon section 4163 if the material were placed in the Record for
the sole purpose of using it in a later campaign.
The Brown court expressed "an understandable unwillingness . . .
to become involved in disputes of a purely political nature. . . .,,0 as
did the court in Straus, "but the public has an overriding interest in
being protected against abuses of the franking privilege where, as here,
the size of the mailing is so large."'6 0 It is submitted, however, that the
public has the right to be protected against any abuse of the congres-
sional franking privilege, a privilege given to a public official not as a
right but as a public trust. Still, the ultimate effect of the holding in
Brown is prohibitory since it provides an interpretation of both sections
4161170 and 4163 71 which further restricts the unauthorized use of free
164. 106 CoNG. REC. 8619 (1960) (remarks of Senator Lausche).
165. 293 F. Supp. at 216.
166. 313 F. Supp. at 827.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 828.
169. Id.
170. 39 U.S.C. § 4161 (1960), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970).
171. 39 U.S.C. § 4163 (1960), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 3212 (1970).
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mailing privileges for the protection and- benefit of the citizen taxpayer.
The Brown decision has raised another issue which will necessitate
future clarification. An action initiated by one other than a congres-
sional candidate remains open to attack on the basis of lack of standing
to sue. The Brown court stated that Tunney had standing to sue on the
grounds of his personal stake in the election. However, "personal stake"
in this instance might imply a variety of standards, each based on differ-
ent analytical interpretations of the rights and duties inherent in the
political process. For example, a campaign aide might assert a personal
stake in an action on the basis of his close association with the candidate
in an economic and professional sense. He has directed a great deal of
time and effort toward the election outcome. A financial contributor
has expended funds and thus may arguably have acquired a personal
stake. Additionally, any political supporter might be thought to be
entitled to relief from the injuries that would flow from the defendant's
violation of the franking privilege. A more extreme formulation would
enable any voter to assert standing on the grounds that his personal stake
is directly imbedded in the representative essence of government itself.
The extremes capable of conjecture reveal the necessity of defining in
the future a precise standard that governs the right to sue; the cases
reveal the necessity of regulatory action and judicially workable guide-
lines.
IV. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
This Comment has primarily concerned itself with potential, rather
than actual, abuse of the franking privilege. Although the present stat-
utory qualifications and administrative regulations are of questionable
deterrent value, criminal sanctions may offer a viable alternative if
utilized.
Section 1719 of the United States Criminal Code provides:
Whoever makes use of any official envelope, label, or indorsement au-
thorized by law, to avoid the payment of postage or registry fee on his
private letter, packet, package, or other matter in the mail, shall be fined
not more than $300.172
Since congressional immunity fails to exempt congressmen from the
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1719 (1948), derived from the Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 103,
§ 5, 19 Stat. 335; Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 180, § 29, 20 Stat. 362; Act of July 5,
1884, ch. 234, § 3, 23 Stat. 158; and Act of July 2, 1886, ch. 611, 24 Stat. 122. Section
1719 is the only statute in the criminal code that makes abuse of the franking privilege
a criminal act. The statute is entitled "Franking Privilege" but has general applica-
tion to the illegal use qf penalty mail as well as to the misuse of franked mail. See
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reach of section 1719, this criminal sanction could provide an effective
means of enforcing violations of the franking statutes.17  The Immunity
Clause was intended to prevent interference with the legislative process
by ensuring that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the
performance of their legislative duties by being called into court to
defend their actions. 174 But the privilege against criminal arrest does not
extend any farther than the speech or debate part of the Clause. The
terms "treason, felony and breach of the peace" contained within the
Clause 175 have been construed by the Supreme Court to include all
criminal offenses170 arising other than from a speech or debate delivered
in Congress. 177  Therefore, a congressman would not be exempt from
a criminal subpoena' 78 or an arrest for violation of section 1719.70
39 U.S.C. § 3202-09 (1970)-the term "penalty mail" is historically derived from
the penalty imposed by section 1719.
Criminal prosecution for an offense under section 1719 is exclusively a function of
the federal government. To obtain a conviction the government would be required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of use of the franking privilege with the in-
tent to avoid payment of postage. Criminal intent is an element of this class of crime
even though it is not specifically mentioned in the statute. Cf. Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (conversion of government property, 18 U.S.C. § 641);
Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1965) (theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1708); and
United States v. Jordan, 284 F. Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1968) (embezzlement, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1709). The government would also be required to prove that the mailing was pri-
vate in character.
A readily assertable defense to a prosecution under section 1719 would be that the
mailing was correspondence upon "official business" as allowed by 39 U.S.C. § 3210
(1970). The trier of fact would then be required to make a factual determination of
the character of the mailing. This determination would probably turn upon the same
criteria as discussed in the text accompanying notes 45-63 supra.
173. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 which provides in part:
[T~he Senators and Representatives shall in all cases, except Treason, Felony
and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance of
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned
in any other Place.
174. The Immunity Clause prevents "intimidation by the executive and accounta-
bility before a possibly hostile judiciary . . .", United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169, 181 (1966), as well as the inconvenience caused by having to defend private
lawsuits. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969); Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
175. See note 173 supra.
176. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
177. Id. See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (Speech and De-
bate Clause bars the criminal prosecution of a congressman for the making of a
speech on the floor of the House solely in consideration for the receipt of money).
178. United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 341 (1800).
179. Cf. United States v. Wise, 28 F. Cas. 742 (No. 16,746a) (Cr. C. Dist. Col.
1842).
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The application of the statute, however, is the measure of its de-
terrent value. Since section 1719 is phrased in the singular, "use of any
official envelope, label, indorsement . . . to avoid the payment of
postage . . on his private letter, packet, package .. ."18, it
is arguable that legislative intent requires the application of the statute
in multiple counts should the illegal mailing be numerous in quan-
tity.""' Thus, each letter or packet mailed in violation of the section
might constitute a separate violation of the statute. This would bring
a maximum fine of $300 per letter. If the illegal mailing were of a
mass character, the ultimate fine would reach immense proportions upon
conviction of each of the alleged counts if the $300 penalty were always
imposed.
Although in a mass mailing context the ultimate fine theoretically
could become quite substantial, there are no reported cases of an
application of this statute to prosecute a congressman. Its deterrent
effect upon congressional abuse of the franking privilege is therefore
questionable. Section 1719 does not allow imprisonment as a sentencing
alternative, and the court is free to impose a nominal fine which would
merely slap the errant congressman's hand for his misdeed. The
genuine deterrent effect of the statute actually lies in the threat of non-
official sanctions. The adverse publicity connected with a prosecution
could anathemitize a politician in an election year. Application of the
existing sanctions could therefore provide a means to publicly casti-
gate a congressman who misused his franking privilege. But the fact
that there have been no reported cases filed against Congressmen
is evidence of the Attorney General's reluctance to prosecute a mem-
ber of a coordinate branch of government for the offense. The statute
therefore provides dubious deterrence.
V. PROPOSED REFORM
Enforced criminal sanctions are a means of curtailing congressional
abuse of the frank. However, only the elimination of the unclarified
language of the present code through direct statutory revision will be
effective. 8 2 This could be accomplished by an addition to the series
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1719 (1948).
181. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1958) (Prosecutions for mailing or transporting ob-
scene matter). The United States Attorney will seek and prosecute upon a multiple
count indictment for the violation of these statutes, i.e., one count for each such item
the defendant attempts to mail. See Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655 (1970)
where the defendants were indicted on twenty-one counts for the violation of sections
1461-62.
182. There are presently pending several bills in Congress concerning the franking
privilege. These bills, however, do not attempt to tighten up the present franking
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of franking statutes specifically denying any use of the congressional
franking privilege for campaign purposes. The proposed section would
extend the effective scope of section 321511 if it is framed as an absolute
limitation.
The effect of the additional restrictions would be twofold. They
would substantially eliminate statutory misinterpretation by the users of
the frank, law enforcement agencies and the courts. The persons
possessing the right to frank mail would be given clear notice of the
limitations on the privilege in the area of political communications.
Further, the proposed restrictions would specifically obviate the prob-
lems presented by section 3212 reprints of Congressional Record in-
sertions. Congressmen would still be allowed to insert whatever they
desire into the Congressional Record, but they would not be permitted
to mail the reprinted material as franked mail if it is of a campaigning
nature. A congressman would no longer be at liberty to flood the
entire country with political propaganda and force the taxpayers to pay
the postage merely because he caused his political speeches or other
material to be placed in the Congressional Record for later reprinting
and franking under section 3212.
The proposed new section would also afford a means to remedy
abuse of the privilege through criminal prosecution of the abuser for
violation of section 1719 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The
proposed addition to Title 39 need not specify penalties for its viola-
tion because its enforcement could easily be linked with the sanctions
imposed in the criminal code against the general abuse of the franking
privilege. However, even this simplistic solution will have a negligible
effect upon franking abuse unless the Postal Service, as the administra-
tive agency responsible for the execution of the postal laws, takes the
decisive action required to regulate the franking privilege and to police its
proper utilization by members of Congress.
Lax administrative regulation is a major cause of the indefiniteness
that pervades the entire problem of franking abuse. The holders of
the privilege in the absence of effective regulation will remain uncertain
of the limits to which the frank may be exercised. Furthermore, regu-
latory interpretation is essential for effective enforcement of the existing
statutory restrictions. 84
statutes, but are proposing to provide for the mailing of letter mail to members of
Congress from their constituents at no cost or at reduced rates. S. 1643, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 6013, 10215, 10703, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
183. 39 U.S.C. § 3215 (1970). See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra for dis-
cussion of this section, and note 72 supra for the text of the section.
184. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
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The current absence of administrative action in regulating franking
use might be due to administrative reluctance to step on political toes,
rather than administrative oversight.' 5 It should be noted that prior
to the recent Postal Reorganization Act, the Postmaster General and the
Assistant Postmasters General were appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate."' Their terms of office were
limited to the administration of the President who appointed them.
1 7
This system of political appointment caused a great deal of patronage in
the executive departments of the Post Office. The possible attrition of
the entire upper echelon of management was dependent upon the whim of
each new administration.8 8 The spoils system may well be the primary
explanation for administrative unwillingness to take any action which
would curry political misfavor.
Fortunately, Congress has recently taken steps in the Reorganiza-
tion Act to end the system of patronage. An express purpose of the
Act is to "[c]onvert the Post Office Department into an independent
establishment in the Executive Branch of the Government, freed from
direct political pressures. . ."I" A method chosen to accomplish
this purpose was to change the system of selection of the Postmaster
General. He is now appointed by the newly created Board of Govern-
ors of the Postal Service rather than by the President.190 The As-
sistant Postmasters General, General Counsel and Judicial Officer are
appointed by the Postmaster General.' 91
185. The court in Rising v. Brown, 313 F. Supp. 824 (C.D. Cal. 1970) remarked:
"it seems that the Post Office Department has ...adopted an understandable 'hands
off' policy rather than tangle with possessors of the privilege." Id. at 827, n.3. See
text accompanying notes 61-62 supra for discussion of the letter of the General Coun-
sel of the Post Office to members of Congress.
186. Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-682, §§ 302, 305, 74 Stat. 579.
187. Id. § 302.
188. The Post Office virtually became a political mechanism under the administra-
tion of Andrew Jackson in 1829 and has remained the principal patronage-dispensing
agency of the party in power since that time. See generally G. CuLLINAN, THE POST
OFFICE DEPARTMENT 44 (1968); HOUSE PoST OFFICE AND CIv-M SERVICE COmm'TEE,
POSTAL REORGANIZATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 91-1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970):
There is wide agreement that vestiges of 19th century political patronage
practices have persisted in the Post Office Department too long and that one
of the cardinal needs of postal reform is to seal off the Postal Service from
partisan political influence.
189. HoUsE PoST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE CoMMrrrEE, POSTAL REORGANIZATION
Acr, H.R. REP. No. 91-1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), quoting in part from the
legislative recommendations of President Richard M. Nixon given to Congress in his
message of April 16, 1970.
190. 39 U.S.C. §§ 202(c), 203 (1970).
191. Id. § 204.
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The Reorganization Act was passed on August 12, 1970 and the
sections changing the selection process of the Postmaster General be-
came effective on that date. 192  But the aforementioned regulations'"
were promulgated on December 23, 1970.194 The fact that the current
regulations are so innocuous in content would tend to show that the
Postmaster General still treads lightly for fear of causing congressional
reprisal.
The Postal Service must take the necessary steps to assure proper
regulation of the free mailing privileges granted by the franking stat-
utes. The agency should immediately promulgate a series of regula-
tions which would effectively curtail franking abuse. The advisory
Postal Service guidelines to the use of the franking privilege previously
discussed herein' 95 are a step in the right direction but fall far short
of what is necessitated by the magnitude of the overall problem. These
guidelines should be promulgated as regulations that would have an
effect upon the users of the privilege.
An analogous area of federal regulation where more effective rules
have been promulgated is in the administration of the "fairness doc-
trine" imposed by the Federal Communications Commission upon radio
and television broadcasters9 6 in general, and the "equal time" require-
ment under the "fairness doctrine" in particular. The equal time pro-
vision requires a broadcaster, if he permits any person to use his fa-
cilities, to allot equal air time to all other candidates for the same pub-
lic office. 197 Enforcement of the provisions of the section 315 equality
doctrine have posed enormous problems of statutory definition and
administrative execution. 9 ' Section 315, like the franking statutes,
did not attempt to define its terms. Therefore, the FCC, as the
agency responsible for the execution of the statute, promulgated regu-
lations to rectify the ambiguity created by the code. For example, the
term "legally qualified candidate" is defined by the "equal time" regu-
lations' 9  as a candidate who has publicly announced his intention to
192. Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 15, 84 Stat. 754.
193. 39 C.F.R. § 137.1 (1971). See note 48 supra.
194. 35 Fed. Reg. 19441 (1970).
195. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
196. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1934).
197. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1959).
198. See generally Blaine, Equality, Fairness and 315: The Frustration of Demo-
cratic Politics, 24 MD. L. REv. 166 (1964); Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal,
3 HARv. I. LEGIS. 257 (1965); Erbst, Equal Time for Candidates: Fairness or Frustra-
tion?, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 190 (1961); Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Never.
land Revisited, 27 MrD. L. REv. 221 (1967).
199. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.120(a), 73.290(a), 73.590(a), 73.657(a) (1971).
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seek office,200 who qualifies under applicable law to hold the office if
elected, 20 1 who is eligible to receive votes,202 and has either been nomi-
nated by a known political party or has made a substantial showing
that he is a bona fide candidate. 20 3  The FCC has at least made an
effort to provide clarity and intelligibility in its interpretation of the
terms of section 315. There is no reason why the Postal Service cannot
take similar action to clear up the ambiguities in the franking statutes.
In fact, the above-mentioned FCC regulations could be adopted and
adapted by the Postal Service for use in regulation of the franking privi-
lege.
The question of use presents a more complex problem for regulation
in the franking area. The "equal time" regulations define "use" as vir-
tually synonymous with "appearance" on any broadcast.204 The ra-
tionale of this rule is that any exposure over a broadcasting facility is
valuable to the candidate in that it serves to acquaint the viewer with
him.20 i But in the franking area this standard would be untenable
because legitimate franking use is possible during a campaign period.
Nevertheless an expansion of the previously published postal guidelines
into preemptive regulation delineating the area of franking utilization
would be a step in the right direction. If a definitive series of regulations
were promulgated by the Postal Service, the possessors of the franking
privilege would be put on notice of the permissible scope of their activity
and judicial evaluation of franking abuse controversies would be sim-
plified.
VI. CONCLUSION
Direct mailing of campaign literature is an effective, albeit expen-
sive, form of voter solicitation. The candidate who establishes this
valuable contact with the electorate through the abuse of his con-
gressional franking privilege acquires an unfair competitive edge over
both his less-advantaged and more scrupulous rivals. The candidate
thus frees funds otherwise earmarked for direct mailing for expendi-
ture in another area of campaign endeavor. The franking statutes, es-
pecially sections 3210 and 3212, are couched in nebulous language
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 27 Fed. Reg.
10063, 10066, para. 111(6) (1962).
205. Derby, Section 315: Analysis and Proposal, 3 HARV. J. LEGIs. 257, 277 (1965).
19721
86 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
which unfortunately gives tacit approval to this questionable practice.
Regulatory supervision over the exercise of the frank has been lax and
ineffective. Moreover, the absence of any attempt by the Postal Serv-
ice to promulgate workable guidelines for the use of the frank was a
major cause of the contradictory results encountered in the Straus and
Brown cases, the only published opinions in this area. The reforms
proposed in this Comment, if adopted, would clarify existing statutory
language and impose stiffer penalties to halt the misuse of the frank.
It will be incumbent upon the Postal Service, however, to promul-
gate regulations which will effectively police the utilization of the frank.
H. Andrew Wasmund
